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1. Introduction 
 
Since Adam Smith, economists have nearly always favored policies that foster competition, as 
competition typically results in lower equilibrium prices for consumers.  It would be reasonable to 
expect therefore that an increase in competition between microfinance institutions would unequivocally 
result in more favorable credit contracts for the entrepreneurial poor in developing countries.  The 
purpose of this paper, however, is to show that competition may actually prove detrimental to some 
or all of the borrowers in a microfinance market. 
We develop a model in which a solitary client-maximizing microfinance institution (MFI) 
competes with an existing informal moneylender to the benefit of each borrower captured in the 
microfinance portfolio. Subsequently we show three potentially adverse effects of the entrance of new 
MFIs into the same pool of borrowers.  First, Bertrand competition between MFIs within the subset of 
profitable borrowers reduces the ability of a socially motivated lender to generate rents that support 
lending to the poorest and potentially least-profitable borrowers.1   This diminution of the capacity to 
cross-subsidize means that the poorest borrowers in the client-maximizing portfolio are dropped as 
competition intensifies.  Second, we show a number of instances in which failure to restrict grant 
funding to the poorest potential borrowers can prevent the emergence of a competitive microfinance 
market altogether, as client-maximizing non-profit institutions undercut profit-maximizers to capture the 
most profitable borrowers in a given pool. 
A third negative effect of MFI competition originates from the likelihood of increasing 
asymmetric information between lenders.  With a greater number of lenders in a market, we would 
expect information sharing between lenders to become more difficult, all else equal.  We show that this 
creates an incentive for some (impatient) borrowers to take multiple loans.  Such instances of multiple 
contracting both increase average debt levels among borrowers in the portfolio and decrease the 
expected equilibrium repayment rate on all loan transactions, generating less-favorable Bertrand 
                                                 
1
 See Shaffer (1996) for an example of cross-subsidization in U.S. lending markets. 
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equilibrium credit contracts.  This makes all patient borrowers worse off, and again results in the 
poorest borrowers being dropped from the loan portfolio.  In general, our results show that while 
wealthier and impatient borrowers are likely to benefit from increasing competition among MFIs, very 
plausible conditions exist under which an increase in the number of lenders in a market will lower the 
welfare of the both the poor and the patient.  
The widespread enthusiasm for microfinance has spawned a dramatic increase in the number of 
microfinance institutions in the developing world.  Spurred by an accord reached at the Microfinance 
Summit in 1997 to reach 100 million of the world's poorest households with credit, there is arguably 
more widespread support for microfinance today than any other single tool for fighting world poverty.  
The microfinance movement has been both praised and supported by a broad range of academic 
scholars, major development finance institutions such as the World Bank, and development practitioners 
themselves.  With the number of MFIs involved in this effort now 1,600 and growing, the overlap and 
competition between these institutions is certain to increase.   
The rapid early growth of the microfinance movement primarily consisted of non-profit, socially 
motivated lenders seeking to reach as many poor clients with credit as they were able, given their 
limited budgets.2   In the process they demonstrated that through the use of new lending technologies, 
such as joint liability contracts and dynamic incentives, a substantial portion of this new market could in 
fact be lent to profitably.  This realization has drawn profit-motivated lending institutions into these 
markets.  The presence of competition from profit-driven lenders has forced MFIs in competitive 
regions to re-think their strategies.  Moreover, donors have questioned the need for continued subsidies, 
resulting in the recent focus on “institutional sustainability” in the MFI sector.   
Although some current research has begun to touch upon these issues, most of the burgeoning 
economic literature on MFIs has been concerned with the impact on MFI clients, (e.g. Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998; Morduch, 1998; Wydick, 1999) or papers that examine the properties of the joint 
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 Tuckman (1998) provides a good survey of competition among non-profit institutions. 
 3 
liability contracts often employed in microenterprise lending (e.g. Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate, 
1995; Ghatak, 1999).  A limited amount of work, however, has undertaken a broader look at the 
industrial organization of the microfinance movement.   
Morduch’s (1999, 2000) work is one such example.  In a detailed analysis of the Grameen Bank, 
Morduch (1999) asserts that the failure to account for tradeoffs between sustainability and poverty 
reduction has hamstrung discussion about the subsidies necessary for microfinance to move forward.  In 
a later paper (Morduch, 2000), he challenges the notion that microfinance provides a ‘win-win’ situation 
for all players involved.  Instead, he argues that subsidized lending to the poor as well as the creation of 
sustainable for-profit institutions should be important, but separate, development goals.     
Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega (2001) apply a variant of Conning’s (1999) model to 
lenders in Bolivia, showing that a high-screening, individually focused institution and a low-screening 
group-lender with poorer clients can coexist in the same market.  While their research discusses the 
client sorting process that will take place under competition, its focus is different from our work in that 
it does not explicitly model interactions between lenders in terms of strategic behavior and  multiple 
contracting by borrowers when more than one lender exists in the market.  Rather, they model the 
second entrant to the market as a Stackelberg follower who focuses on collateral-based lending and 
hence captures the wealthiest and most productive segment of the market. 
More similar to this paper in its approach to strategic behavior is Hoff and Stiglitz (1998), who 
show that subsidies to a lending market can generate the perverse consequences of market exit and 
increasing equilibrium prices.  In their model, these effects can arise either as a result of the loss of scale 
economies, or due to a weakening of reputation effects as the number of lenders dilutes information in 
the market.  We also relate information asymmetries to poorer equilibrium loan contracts for borrowers 
in Section 4 of this paper.  However, in the Hoff and Stiglitz model, perverse effects are caused by the 
weakening of dynamic repayment incentives, whereas in our model it is caused by asymmetric 
information between lenders over borrower indebtedness.   
 4 
Other papers have also examined the industrial organization of credit markets.  Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) show that multi-period, state-contingent contracts, or “relationship banking” is an efficient 
contracting device for dealing with asymmetric information, and for this reason market power can lead 
to lower quality firms obtaining finance.  Similarly, since the screening required in multi-lender markets 
is wasteful, the authors demonstrate that borrower welfare can decrease as competition intensifies.  
Broecker (1990), examining an equilibrium under Bertrand competition, shows that imperfect 
information provides an additional reason for undercutting, as offering the prevailing interest rate causes 
the lender to attract only those borrowers rejected by other lenders.  Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), illustrate 
a “blockaded” market, where Bertrand competition leads to no more than two lenders being present in a 
market in equilibrium.   Marquez (2002), however, presents a model where entry is easier as turnover 
increases, weakening blockading.  A more applied view of the escalating competition present in 
microfinance markets is provided by Rhyne and Christen (1999), who suggest that information sharing 
in the form of credit bureaus is becoming increasingly necessary as the microfinance market matures. 
 
2. Increasing Numbers and Competition among MFIs  
We wish to motivate our theoretical model with evidence from three areas of the world in which MFI 
activity has reached a relatively advanced stage, and where the effects of competition between MFIs 
have become increasingly clear.     
Bangladesh: The Grameen Bank, long the flagship of the microfinance movement, has 
consistently been upheld as a pinnacle of stability, self-sufficiency, and effectiveness in using 
microfinance as a tool for lifting households from poverty.  Yet the Grameen Bank's well-known 
successes have encouraged imitators, which compete for borrowers’ attention along with two other very 
large microcredit providers, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Rural 
Development Project 12 (RD-12), that have operated alongside the Grameen Bank for more than a 
decade.  A front page Wall Street Journal article in November 2001 raised warnings about the financial 
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health of the Grameen Bank, asserting “imitators have brought on more competition, making it harder 
for Grameen to control their borrowers”.  The article points in particular to the Grameen Bank’s lending 
in the region of Tangail, in which competitive pressures have reduced interest rates for some borrowers, 
but where 32.1 percent of the Grameen Bank’s loans have fallen more than two years overdue:  
In Tangail, signboards for rival Micro lenders dot a landscape of gravel roads, jute fields and ponds with 
simple fishing nets.  Shopkeepers playing cards in the village of Bagil Bazar can cite from memory the 
terms being offered by seven competing microlenders--a typical repayment plan for a 1,000-taka ($17) loan 
is 25 taka for 46 weeks.  At an annualized rate, that works out to 30% in interest.  Surveys have estimated 
that 23% to 43% of families borrowing from microlenders in Tangail borrow from more than one.  
(WSJ: 11/27/2001) 
 
 Such conditions in Bangladesh, with perhaps the world’s most developed microfinance industry, have 
put huge financial pressures on lenders, and have led to spiraling default rates.  Where once Grameen 
boasted repayment rates of 95% or higher, the Wall Street Journal reports 19% of the portfolio overdue 
by a year or more.  Alarming figures such as these have intensified efforts by the World Bank and 
CGAP to help bring together a network of the largest 20 microfinance institutions in Bangladesh to 
implement a centrally managed credit information system during 2004.  It is hoped that more “centrally 
managed” competition between lenders in Bangladesh will both help to foster healthy competition 
between MFIs while bringing down arrears rates in MFI portfolios.  
 East Africa: While East Africa is at an earlier stage of competition, the major urban centers of 
Uganda and Kenya are becoming saturated by competition among numerous MFIs (see Kaffu & 
Mutesasira, 2003).  Markets for the more wealthy borrowers that were previously dominated by grant-
funded, socially motivated lenders are now being contested by private institutions.  For example, 
CERUDEB and CMF, two private lenders with access to subsidized external lines of credit, have begun 
competing with existing MFIs for larger microcredit borrowers.  In response, there is increasing 
competitive pressure on socially motivated MFIs, whose interest rates may be more than 1% per month 
higher than the new competition.   
FAULU, one of the few major MFIs to operate in both Uganda and Kenya, is troubled by the 
increasing presence of borrowers unknowingly receiving loans from multiple lenders.  FAULU reports 
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that such behavior has become increasingly prevalent as the intensity of MFI activity increases.   The 
Kenya office is able to employ a risk management network based on the country’s national ID system to 
detect clients within their own portfolio with multiple loans.  Uganda, however, has no such national ID 
system, and so they are powerless to monitor the problem, even within their own institution.   
 Central America: The increase in both the size and number of MFIs operating in Central 
America since the mid-1990s has been astounding.  Much of the reason for this has been political: both 
the United States and the European Union have desired to develop an entrepreneurial middle-class in the 
region in order to try to bridge the societal divisions responsible for civil wars during the 1980s.  As a 
result, growth in MFI activity has been particularly heavy in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. 
     (Insert Table 1 here) 
The case of Nicaragua is typical of the region.  FAMA, an ACCION International affiliate, 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly in microfinance lending in the Managua area for the few years after it 
commenced operations in 1992.  However, by 1996 approximately six other major MFIs entered the 
market, though even by 1997 no MFIs in the region had a portfolio of more than 4,000 borrowers.  
Moreover, according to ASOMIF, the association of Nicaraguan microfinance institutions, the 
portfolios of Nicaraguan MFIs grew at an annual rate of 47% between 1997 and 2001 (La Prensa, 
10/02/2002). By 2001 the largest MFIs were carrying portfolios in the range of 15,000-25,000 
borrowers, with considerable overlap in geographical operating regions.  Table 1 gives USAID data 
illustrating microlending growth during 1999-2001 of the five largest MFIs receiving USAID funding.  
Note that as portfolios have increased dramatically, levels of arrears have also risen in all but one case. 
 Guatemala and El Salvador have experienced similarly dramatic growth in MFI activity.  
FUNDAP in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, like its sister ACCION institution in Nicaragua, experienced 
very little competition from other MFIs since its inception in 1988 until the mid-1990s.  New entrants 
into its regional market, such as FUNDESPE and Fe y Alegria, have forced FUNDAP to cut interest 
rates on its larger loans from 3% to 2.5% per month.  To remain solvent under competition, it has pulled 
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away from its initial mission of offering smaller loans in the form of group-based credit, and instead 
now lends to a wealthier, more lucrative segment of the market.  While average initial loan size was 
US$135 and average monthly sales were US$291 for borrowers receiving their first loans between 1988 
and 1993, by 1999 these figures for new clients had grown to US$543 and US$672, respectively.3   
 Asymmetric information between lenders over borrower quality and indebtedness has been a 
mounting issue in all three countries, but there have been great differences between the three countries 
in the level of cooperation realized between MFIs to mitigate the problem.  El Salvador, with its 
internet-driven Info-Red borrower database4, represents the best example of a case where a network of 
independent MFIs have built information-based institutions reminiscent of those in developed countries, 
where nearly instantaneous credit checks are possible.  In Guatemala, multiple contracting by MFI 
clients had become so damaging by the late 1990s that REDIMIF, an association of 19 MFIs embarked 
on an effort to establish CREDIREF, a centralized microfinance credit bureau, which though now 
functional, is still in its nascent stages.  Cooperation between MFIs during the mid-1990s was fairly 
strong in Nicaragua; institutions regularly shared information on poorly performing borrowers with one 
another.  However, as MFIs poured into the market in the late 1990s, cooperation has deteriorated to 
such an extent that, as one loan officer put it "our information-sharing consists of a trip to the local 
cantina to ask neighbors if loan officers from other MFIs have been paying visits to a potential client.”   
 
3. Basic Model: Full Information 
 
3.1 Analytical framework 
 
Consider an MFI operating in a large pool of potential borrowers who, for well-established 
reasons, are denied access to credit in the formal financial sector.  New lending technologies such as 
group lending, community banking, and dynamic incentives (as well as the possibility of grant funding) 
have allowed an MFI access to these borrowers.  Let this pool of potential borrowers be defined by the 
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 Figures are inflation-adjusted.  Source: sample of 376 field surveys conducted in Guatemala in 1994-1999. 
4
 Info Red’s internet-based system can be accessed at http://www.infored.com.sv.   
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set { },...n,2 1≡  where   is indexed in ascending order of an initial level of productive assets ki, 
pertaining to each ∈i .   The corresponding set of initial assets { }nkkk ..., 21≡  is observable to the 
MFI and uniformly distributed within   such that ξ=−+ ii kk 1 , where 1−
−
=
n
kkξ , and for notational 
ease we denote the lowest level of endowment, k1, as k and the highest, kn, as k . 
For each borrower ∈i , the MFI considers granting a loan Vi  at an interest rate ri.  The interest 
cost of capital for the MFI is equal to c, and on each loan it incurs fixed administrative costs F.  The 
loan offered by the MFI is subject to a participation constraint, representing the best alternative source 
of financing by borrower i.  We will represent this best alternative financing as offered by a local 
moneylender competing over the same set of potential borrowers   offering loans that return a profit 
( )mimiBi rV ,Π  to borrower ∈i .  The moneylender has lower fixed costs per loan than the MFI, Fm < F, 
but a higher cost of capital, cm > c, and thus operates at a cost disadvantage (advantage) for loan sizes 
( )
cc
FFV
m
m
i
−
−
<> .  We assume that prior to the entry of the MFI, the monopolistic moneylender operates 
in a predatory manner as in Basu (1984), such that the moneylender is able to induce any borrower i to 
accept a loan contract that leaves his client with only some very small level of profit, ε > 0.   
If a borrower receives a loan, the resulting investment yields a low return per unit of borrowed 
capital of β < 1 with probability ( )iii Vkp ,  due to a lack of ability to post sufficient collateral, and a high 
return of ir+> 1β  with probability ( )iii Vkp ,1− .  We posit that the probability of the low return, in 
which the borrower is forced to default on 1 - β  of the principal is decreasing in ki and increasing in Vi .  
This is equivalent to saying that a wealthier individual has a higher probability of repaying a loan of a 
given size than a poorer individual, and that increasing the size of the loan to a given individual cannot 
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increase the probability of repayment.6  To simplify our model, we assume pv > 0 and pk < 0 to be 
constant and that ikivi kpVppp ++= .
7
  We abstract from strategic default in the sense that any project 
yield up to and including ( ) ii Vr+1  is forfeited to the lender.  Profit to the borrower is thus 
    iii
B
i Vrp ))1()(1( +−−=Π β                      (1) 
while profit to the MFI is 
( )( ) FVcVpVrp iiiiiiMFIi −+−++−=Π )1(11 β .        (2) 
The profit function of the moneylender is identical to that of the lending institution, except for the 
moneylender’s lower fixed costs per loan, mF , and higher cost of capital, mc .  The slope of the 
borrower’s isoprofit curves can be derived through total differentiation of (1) to obtain       
    
( )
( )( ) ( )( )pVpr
pV
dr
dV
ivi
i
i
i
−−+−
−−
=
11
1
β .     (3) 
The isoprofit curves for the borrower are strictly decreasing in ri and backward-bending with respect 
to Vi  because the borrower fears default as the loan becomes too large.  Similarly we totally 
differentiate (2) to obtain the slope of the lender’s isoprofit curves: 
( )
( )( ) ( )crrpVp
pV
dr
dV
iiiiv
ii
i
i
−−−++
−
= β1
1
.                (4) 
 The lender’s isoprofit curves are increasing in ri and also backward-bending in Vi  due to the risk 
of default in large loans. The lender’s isoprofit curves are positively (negatively) sloped for values of 
( )
( ) 





−−
−+
−
<> ik
i
i
v
i kpp
r
cr
p
V β12
1)( .  Note that  cm > c implies that the indifference curves of the 
moneylender are steeper on the negatively sloped portion and flatter on the positively sloped portion; 
the critical Vi at which the slope becomes vertical is also lower than for the MFI.  The borrower’s 
                                                 
 
6
 Boundary conditions on parameters given in the Appendix guarantee that ( )1,0∈ip  for all [ ]kkk i ,∈ .   
7
 For analytical tractability, we assume p to be independent of the interest rate. 
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isoprofit curves at ri < 1−β  are positively (negatively) sloped for )1(2
1)( ik
v
i kppp
V −−>< .  This 
implies that the value of Vi  at which the borrower’s isoprofit curve bends backward is higher than that 
for the lender if 1 + c and β>+ mc1  (see Assumption 3 below).  This and other assumptions in our 
model include the following: 
Assumption 1: “Moneylender Feasibility”. In the absence of competition, the moneylender can offer 
some loan to every borrower in the pool that is weakly profitable for both.  In other words for each 
∈i , ∃  some ),( ii rV  for which ( ) 0)(),( ≥Π iiML krkV  and ( ) 0)(),( ≥Π iiB krkV .  This implies k  is 
larger than some minimum value whose terms, given in the parameters of the model, are provided in 
the Appendix.   
Assumption 2: “Microfinance Lending Environment”.  When an MFI competes with a moneylender, 
there exists more than one profitable borrower and at least one unprofitable borrower for the MFI in 
the borrower pool.  In other words, at its optimal loan contract ),( ** ii rV  for each ∈i , we 
have 1
0*)*,(
>
>Π∈ rVi MFI
i
 and 1
0*)*,(
≥
<Π∈ rVi MFI
i
.  The parameters that satisfy this condition are also 
detailed in the Appendix.   
Assumption 3: “Potential Lender Loss”.  We assume both the moneylender and the MFI will lose money 
in the bad state of nature for the borrower, or specifically that mc+1  and β>+ c1 .  This is 
consistent with what we expect to be true in a developing-country context: a lender will lose money 
under default and will require more interest to risk larger loans in equilibrium.  It implies that 
equilibrium contracts reside on the positive slope of both lender and borrower isoprofit curves. 
These assumptions are necessary for equilibrium calibration of the model; we also believe they reflect 
the lending environment within which most MFIs operate in the developing areas of the world.  
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3.2 The MFI as client-maximizer  
The behavior of a profit-maximizing lender is well understood, but less clear is the objective of a non-
profit MFI, as are the great preponderance of NGOs involved in microlending.   We argue here that the 
objective of such an institution is typically to maximize its “outreach”, or the number of clients, n*, 
captured into its portfolio.  The constraints are a net budget-balancing requirement, the participation 
constraint, and non-negativity constraints.  A non-profit, client-maximizing MFI which (potentially) 
receives grant funding, , therefore solves the following problem: 
        
  
, ii rV
Maximize n*  subject to 
                BC:  0),( ≥+Π GrV iiMFIi          (Institutional Budget Constraint) 
                PC:     ),(),( mimiBiiiBi rVrV Π≥Π   (Borrower Participation Constraint) 
 
                NC:     0, ≥ii rV                            (Non-negativity Constraints) 
for all i captured in the MFI borrower portfolio. 
The intuition of the MFI problem, given more formally in the proofs of LEMMAS 1 and 2, is 
straightforward, and is as follows: The MFI maximizes its number of clients, n*, by first capturing the 
set of profitable borrowers, P , from the moneylender. This is accomplished though offering a 
contract9 ( )ii rV ,  to P∈i  that leaves each P∈i  indifferent to the best contract the moneylender is 
able to offer (at which ( )mimiMLi rV ,Π  = 0 and the PC binds). These equilibrium contracts are profitable 
for the MFI but not to the moneylender, since on larger loans, the MFI’s lower cost of capital more than 
makes up for its higher fixed lending costs.  To maximize the number of borrowers in its portfolio, the 
                                                 
9
 Though little variation in interest rates is often observed in less competitive microfinance markets, much greater variation 
in interest rates among different types of borrowers is observed as financial markets mature and become more competitive, 
as seen for example in economies with highly developed financial systems.  In the more mature microfinance markets in 
Central America, we are already beginning to observe competitive pressure giving birth to multiple loan products at differing 
interest rates that are targeted at a borrowers with varying levels of initial assets. 
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surplus,  from lending to P  is used to subsidize loans to NP~ , a subset of the non-profitable 
borrowers NP .  NP1
~
  thus consists of the set of m* unprofitable borrowers captured into the portfolio 
by means of cross subsidy A and grant funding .   Cross-subsidization begins with the borrowers 
{ }...2,1
ˆˆ
−− kk ii  on whom losses are the smallest on the MFI contract at the point where the PC binds.  
The number of unprofitable borrowers m* in the portfolio is then maximized by offering contracts to 
increasingly poorer borrowers until the BC binds.  Borrowers too poor to be reached by the MFI receive 
the exploitative monopoly moneylender contract for which ( ) ε=Π mimiBi rV , .11  The following lemmas 
are foundational for the propositions that follow: 
LEMMA 1: There exists a Pareto-efficient contract curve for every loan made between a lender and each 
borrower i.   
PROOF: See the Appendix.  
By setting (3) equal to (4) we obtain the tangency points between the isoprofit curves of the MFI and 
borrower i.  This condition reduces to 
( )( ) ( )( ) 01 =+−−−+ cpVp iiv βββ     (5a) 
which forms an Edgeworth-like contract curve for each borrower given by the dark horizontal curves in 
Figures 1a and 1b. (The moneylender’s contract curve is shown by the lower dashed line.)  By 
substituting the default function into (5a) we obtain  
( ) ( )( ) 





−−
−
+−
= ik
v
ii kpp
c
p
kV ββ
β 1
2
1*
    (5b) 
noting that the moneylender’s optimal contract is identical except that ( ) ( )iiimi kVkV *<∗  since cm > c.  
The contract curves are linear and horizontal, meaning that differences in the contractual interest rate 
represent a direct transfer of profit between the borrower and lender.  Figure 1a gives the example of a 
borrower P∈i , for whom the MFI surplus is positive where the PC is binding.  In Figure 1b, the 
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 If we relax Assumption 1, then the MFI may able to reach poorer borrowers than the moneylender.  This complicates the 
model, though the main results of the model are unchanged except that in order to reach the maximum number of borrowers 
the true client-maximizing MFI will extract the entire surplus from loans to such borrowers.    
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surplus is negative to the MFI for a borrower NP~∈i  at the point where the PC binds. It is important to 
see how borrower welfare increases by virtue of entry from the MFI, moving from points A to A* and B 
to B*, respectively. Entry of the MFI makes borrower profits rise and moneylender profits fall, so that 
the equilibrium contract changes from a contract that lies at zero profit for the borrower to a contract 
that lies at zero profit for the moneylender for all i NPP  ~∪∈ . 
(Insert Figures 1a and 1b here.) 
LEMMA 2:  The client-maximizing objective yields an equilibrium loan contract in which  (i) ( )ikV *  is 
increasing in ki, (ii) equilibrium profit to the MFI is increasing in ki, (iii) lending to poorer 
 borrowers is subsidized by profits from wealthier borrowers, (iv) a unique number of clients receive 
loans from the MFI for any microfinance subsidy  ≥ 0. 
PROOF: See the Appendix. 
In Figure 2 we can observe the two pivotal asset endowments: ikˆ ∈ is the asset endowment of the 
break-even borrower, while ik
~
∈  is the asset endowment of the borrower NP~∈i  who causes the BC 
to bind, and so is the poorest agent offered credit by the client-maximizing MFI.  We denote )0(~k as the 
poorest agent served by the MFI in the absence of grant funding and )(~ Gk as the poorest served in the 
presence of some  > 0. 
We believe the equilibrium illustrated in LEMMA 2 is the typical case of microfinance markets.  
In a borrower pool in which all borrowers have extremely low initial endowments and { }∅=P , only 
grant-funded agencies can survive.  In cases in which all borrowers have very high endowments and 
{ }∅=NP , we should observe all lending conducted by for-profit lenders rather than grant-supported 
NGOs.  The typical microfinance market is the intermediate case where cross-subsidization within a 
given client pool is possible, and the losses realized on loans to borrowers ∈ NP~ can be covered by a 
combination of grants and profits made from lending to borrowers ∈ P .  One implication of this is that 
when there is a single client-maximizing MFI that has access to the borrowing pool, there is no need to 
target grant funding towards the poor in this intermediate case.  All surplus is automatically directed to 
the poorest clients. Figure 2 illustrates the surplus by borrower across the set  : 
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(Insert Figure 2 here.) 
 
3.3 Competition from a profit-maximizing market entrant   
In many parts of the world, the new lending technology has begun to attract profit-seeking entrants 
into the microfinance market.12  We now consider the effects of the entrance of a competing MFI, where 
unlike with the incumbent moneylender, the incumbent MFI and entrant MFI possess the same lending 
technology.   Assume first that the incumbent is a client-maximizing MFI with  = 0.  The profit 
maximizer solves the following, more familiar problem:        

=
Π
1,
max
i
MFI
i
rV ii
, subject to: 
                     PC:   ),(),,(),( ** mimiBiiiBiiiBi rVrVrV ΠΠ≥Π  (Participation Constraint) 
                        NC: irV ii
MFI
i     0,, ∀≥Π                      (Non-negativity Constraint) 
Based on their respective objective functions, Bertrand competition by these identical MFIs will take 
place over P∈i , which induces undercutting for all borrowers for whom the PC and the NC are 
satisfied.  Under competition solely with the moneylender, the PC of the cross-subsidizing MFI’s binds 
for all borrowers NPP ~ ∪∈i  at the level where 0),( =Π mimiMLi rV .   For the profit-maximizing MFI 
under competition, it is the NC that binds for all P∈i because the incumbent MFI, using identical 
technology, then defines the PC.  For the break-even borrower ∈ki ˆ , both constraints are binding 
under both market structures, and so the contract offers are the same.  We denote the equilibrium MFI 
contract under moneylender competition as ( )** , ii rV , and the Bertrand competitive equilibrium after 
entry of a second MFI by ( )**** , ii rV . 
PROPOSITION 1:  Bertrand competition between MFIs benefits wealthier borrowers, but makes a group 
of poorer borrowers worse off. 
                                                 
12
 Two examples in Guatemala are BanRural and BanCafe, formal lenders that have entered the microfinance market, and 
now are major providers of microcredit in the country; another example is the well-known BancoSol in Boliva. 
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PROOF: The proof follows in a straightforward manner from LEMMAS 1 and 2.  Under Bertrand 
competition between MFIs, ( ) 0, **** →Π iiMFIi rV  for ∀ P∈i .  Since by LEMMA 1 all contracts in 
equilibrium are Pareto efficient, this implies that ( ) ( )****** ,, iiBiiiBi rVrV Π>Π  for ∀ P∈i .  Because 
( ) 0, **** =Π iiMFIi rV  for ∀ P∈i  in equilibrium, this renders cross-subsidization impossible.  Therefore, 
borrower profits for ∀ NP~∈i  fall from ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  to ( )mimiBi rV ,Π  where ( )mimi rV ,  is the monopolistic 
moneylender contract.  We know that ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  > ( )mimiBi rV ,Π  because when two MFIs compete in 
Bertrand equilibrium we have ( ) 0, >Π mimiMLi rV  and ( ) ε=Π mimiBi rV ,   for ∀ NP~∈i  .  Conversely, with 
only a single MFI competitor the PC binds for ∀ NP~∈i  by LEMMA 2, implying that at ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  we 
have ( ) 0, =Π mimiMLi rV .  Since all contracts in equilibrium are Pareto efficient by LEMMA 1,  an 
equilibrium contract such that ( ) 0, =Π mimiMLi rV  therefore implies that ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  > ε.           
Notice that faced with entry by a profit-maximizing MFI, the client-maximizing MFI responds 
by conforming to the behavior of a profit-maximizing MFI.  Profits to the Bertrand competitors go to 
zero in equilibrium; all surplus is captured in higher profits to the wealthiest borrowers in  . 
3.4 Competitive equilibrium with non-targeted subsidies 
We will refer to a subsidy that has been earmarked by the donor for underwriting the costs of loans 
specifically to unprofitable (poorer) borrowers as a “targeted” subsidy, while we refer to subsidies that 
are at the full discretion of the lender as “non-targeted”.  Because a non-targeted subsidy can be used to 
undercut contracts to profitable clients, the presence of such grants will thwart the realization of the 
Bertrand equilibrium when another MFI is unsubsidized.   
PROPOSITION 2: The presence of a client-maximizing MFI with a non-targeted subsidy will prevent the 
entry, or force the exit of, any unsubsidized MFI. 
PROOF:  In order to maximize the number of borrowers in its portfolio, the client-maximizing MFI with 
a non-targeted subsidy minimizes the loss from capturing each borrower into its portfolio, NPP ~ ∪ .  
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Since it is the NC rather than the PC with the moneylender that is binding under Bertrand competition, 
borrowers in P  require the smallest draw on the subsidy.  Therefore, the subsidized MFI minimizes its 
loss on each borrower through a contract of ( )ζ−**** , ii rV  to ∀ P∈i , where ζ is arbitrarily small.  
Such a contract lies on the Pareto efficient contract curve by LEMMA 1, and hence is preferred by 
borrower i since ( ) ( )******** ,, iiBiiiBi rVrV Π>−Π ζ .   Since MFIs are assumed to be identical in lending 
technology, a contract on the contract curve that yields ( )ζ−Π **** , iiBi rV  implies that 
( ) 0, **** <−Π ζiiMFIi rV , therefore leaving no independently feasible contract for the unsubsidized MFI.  
PROPOSITION 3: Competition between two client-maximizing MFIs with non-targeted subsidies will lead 
to a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in which the market share of each MFI will be proportional to its level 
of grant funding. 
PROOF: See the Appendix 
The intuition to the proof is that since Bertrand competition eliminates profits on each profitable 
borrower P∈i , all borrowers must be captured through competitive subsidy in the client 
maximization process.  One can think of each subsidized MFI as “purchasing” borrowers for its 
portfolio, where in equilibrium, arbitrage behavior takes place such that the “market price” of capturing 
each borrower is equilibrated across all those with access to MFI credit.  The resulting Nash equilibrium 
can be seen in Figure 3 (with the example of  ), where the specific borrower i served by each 
institution is undetermined.  Note that and that all borrowers that remain in the portfolio NPP ~ ∪  are 
(weakly) better off than under cross-subsidization. 
     (Insert Figure 3 here.)  
3.5 Competition from an MFI market entrant with a targeted subsidy 
 If one competitor is a client-maximizer with a targeted subsidy and the other a client-maximizer 
with a non-targeted subsidy, then the competitive equilibrium is different from the previous case since 
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the targeting lender is prevented from expending grant resources on profitable clients.  As a result, the 
non-targeting lender must only offer ( )ζ−**** , ii rV  in order to capture all P∈i .   Since the non-
targeting lender can capture P∈i at negligible cost, it is likewise able to focus (nearly) all of its grant 
resources on capturing as many NP∈i  as possible.  The nature of the grant-based competition is the 
same as the previous case, except only contracts to the poorer borrowers, NP∈i , are contested.  
PROPOSITION 3 now holds only over unprofitable borrowers; the share of NP~  captured by each lender 
now becomes proportional to grant funding. Thus, all P∈i are better off if neither lender targets, but 
all NP~∈i are better off if even one lender targets.  (Note that only  - 1 targeting lenders are required 
to make all  client-maximizing lenders behave as if they were targeting.) 
PROPOSITION 4: Market entry of a client-maximizing, subsidized MFI with funding specifically targeted 
to poor borrowers may cause poor borrowers to lose access to MFI credit. 
PROOF: Recall that 
∈
Π≡
P
  
i
MFI
i or the total profits realized on profitable borrowers by the incumbent 
client-maximizing MFI1 facing only moneylender competition (equal to the area  in Figure 2).   
Case (a): The incumbent is unsubsidized.  As the entrant (MFI2) and incumbent MFI1 engage in 
Bertrand competition over P∈i , 0→ . In the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, the total subsidy for 
lending to the set of poorer borrowers NP  will be smaller unless ≥.   If < then 
( ) ( )0~~ kk > , which implies ∃ i for which NPi ~∈ , but NPi ~∉ , where NPNPNP   ⊂~,~  are the sets 
of non-profitable borrowers captured before and after entry of the competing MFI.  Any i for which 
NPi 
~
∈  but NPi 
~
∉ is strictly worse off since ( )mimiBi rV ,Π   < ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  by PROPOSITION 1.  
Case (b): The incumbent has a targeted subsidy. (This case is a hybrid between the unsubsidized 
competitive equilibrium and the client-maximizer with an untargeted subsidy from section 3.5.)   
Without competition from the entrant MFI, the PC is binding for ∀ NPi ~∈  by LEMMA 2, and the total 
subsidy needed to capture each NPi 1
~
∈  into the portfolio is ( )
∈
Π
NP~
**
,
Bi
ii
MFI
i rV   += . Consider 
entry by a client-maximizing MFI with targeted subsidy .  The ensuing competitive Nash equilibrium 
is similar to that in PROPOSITION 3 in that 0<Π=Π MFIj
MFI
i  for 
NPi 2
~
∈  except that the targeted nature 
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of the subsidies results in 0=Π MFIi  for ∀ Pi ∈ .  In contrast to case without MFI competition, the PC 
binds in competitive equilibrium for NPi ~∈  only for the poorest borrower, ( )2~ Gki + , and the total MFI 
subsidy allocated to NP~  equals ( ) MFIimm Π+ *2*1 = G1+G2 , i = ( )21~ GGki + .  (Refer to the proof of 
PROPOSITION 3).  Thus for ⊇NP2
~
  NP1
~
 , we must have   ≥ −Π⋅ ′
MFI
im
*
1 , where ( )1~ Gkii =′ , 
otherwise it must be that NPNP 12
~~
 ⊂ .  Observing that −Π⋅ ′
MFI
im
*
1  > , note that the conditions for 
the poorest borrowers losing access to MFI credit are less restrictive in Case (b) than in Case (a).   
If indeed falls below the critical level shown in Case (b), then there are both winners and 
losers within NP  under competition between MFIs with targeted subsidies.  The set of borrowers NP2
~
  
are better off since competition to attract them into the portfolios increases the subsidy level of their 
equilibrium contract.  In contrast, those in NP1
~
  but left out of NP2
~
  are worse off since upon being 
dropped from the MFI portfolio, their profits fall from ( )** , iiBi rVΠ  to ( )mimiBi rV ,Π .    
An interesting implication of PROPOSITIONS 3 and 4 is that a maximum number of borrowers 
could be reached under a collusive strategy between the two MFIs.  In a collusive strategy, MFIs could 
agree to split the market by jointly offering contracts at which the PC with the moneylender is binding. 
By PROPOSITION 3, the collusive strategy is not a Nash equilibrium. However, collusion generates a total 
subsidy of + + G2 to capture borrowers in NP , resulting in a larger set of poor borrowers, NPC2
~
 , 
with MFI credit access. Thus for any given < we have NPC
NPNP
212
~~~
 ⊂⊂ , noting, however, that 
NP
C
NP
22
~~
 ⊂  would have less favorable contracts under collusion than competition.  The difficulties of 
sustaining collusion in this model are typical of any cartel, especially for loans to profitable borrowers.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting that collusion between client-maximizing lenders leads to the maximum 
redistribution towards the poor and the most evenly distributed benefits of microlending. 
3.6 Summary of Conclusions from the Basic Competitive Model: 
• Entry of an MFI is beneficial to all borrowers accessing MFI credit; it increases borrower profits 
from the optimal contract for the moneylender to the reservation profit of the moneylender. 
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• In competitive markets, profit-maximizers and unsubsidized client-maximizers always behave 
the same way.  Thus, under competition it is not the motivation, but rather the extent and the 
nature of the grant funding of a lender that matters. 
• Targeting of subsidies is unimportant in a market with a single client-maximizing MFI; the 
distinction only becomes important under MFI competition. 
• Lenders with non-targeted subsidies can always drive any unsubsidized competitor out of the 
market altogether, whereas targeted subsidies can never eliminate a competitor from the market. 
• Every competitive scenario involving a lender with targeted subsidies results in a market that is 
both competitive and in which some of the poor receive loans. 
• Competition never makes any profitable borrower worse off. 
• The only way in which the poor can be reached without subsidies is if a client maximizer exists 
as a solitary MFI in the market and competes only with a moneylender.  However, in this case 
subsidies are merely being generated from amongst the other, less poor borrowers. 
• If rents to the incumbent MFI from lending to the non-poor are higher than the grant funding of 
an entrant MFI, then the entrant can actually decrease the funding available to underwrite loans 
to the poor even if the grants are targeted specifically towards the poor. 
• Collusive behavior between client-maximizing MFIs can result in the maximum number of 
borrowers reached by MFIs, and the most evenly distributed benefits among borrowers. 
 
4. Extended Model: Asymmetric Information between Lenders 
4.1 Asymmetric information and dynamic incentives 
In the previous section, we developed a basic model in which information about borrower 
heterogeneity was common knowledge between borrower and lender.  An implicit assumption of the 
basic model is that a lender is able to ascertain the optimal contract through observation of a borrower’s 
capital endowment.  We continue to assume that heterogeneity in   remains observable to the MFI. 
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However, we now assume that each borrower ∈i  is characterized by a personal rate of time 
preference, ∈iρ  [ ρρ, ] per lending period, information that is hidden to the MFI, whose per-period 
profit function we assume is unchanged and homogeneous across institutions.  Let ( )ig ρ  represents the 
density function of ρi and ( )iG ρ  its associated distribution function. The distribution of time preference 
is assumed to be orthogonal to the distribution of k.  Timing is more important in the extended model, 
so we lay it out explicitly as follows: 
   (Insert Figure 4 here.)  
We now bring into our analysis the issue of dynamic incentives.  Dynamic incentives provide 
motivation for repayment when borrowers lack collateral to secure loans by implicitly promising 
continued credit access as a reward for loan repayment.  They are routinely used by MFIs (and other 
lenders) in poor areas of developing countries to mitigate issues of moral hazard involved with credit 
transactions. The present value to a borrower of the continued access to MFI credit, ( )iik ρ,Γ , is 
positively related to the advantage offered by MFI financing relative to the alternative (moneylender) 
contract, and a negatively related to a borrower’s rate of time preference.13   
To focus our attention on issues related to problems of asymmetric information and competition, 
we will concentrate on the case of two MFIs engaged in Bertrand competition over the pool of 
borrowers with Pi ∈   (Competition over NPi ∈ yields similar results.)   Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) 
show that dynamic incentives are weakened by new market entrants as this improves the reservation 
loan contract available to borrowers in the case of default.  Their results imply borrowers must 
somehow be punished for default by the financial system as a whole, through a system of negative 
borrower information-sharing, i.e. each lender sharing its lista negra (as it is often referred to in Latin 
American MFIs--the blacklist).   
                                                 
13
 To concentrate our analysis on borrower behavior we assume that lenders continue to maximize single-period profits; 
the results derived are consistent with lender discounting provided that all lenders share the same discounting process.   
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What we illustrate in this section is that even within a system that identifies defaulting 
borrowers, other gaps involving asymmetric information between lenders must be bridged.  We show 
that it is also critical for lenders to share positive borrower information with one another, even regarding 
well-performing loans, i.e. that a lista blanca (a list of positive information) is also necessary.  This is 
true even in a model without strategic default.  In order to concentrate on this issue, we take as our 
informational benchmark market with Bertrand competition in which all lenders fully share the lista 
negra, where defaulters are denied future formal credit access, but no positive information is shared.  
The objective function of borrower i under dynamic incentives now becomes 
    
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]iiiiiBi kVrpMax ρβ ,11 Γ++−−=Π .   (6) 
As ρi increases, the borrower becomes less concerned about lack of future credit access, and with any 
∈ik , prefers a larger loan size.  We see this through total differentiation of (6) with respect to 
iV and ri which yields       
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )iiviivi
ii
i
i
kppVpr
pV
dr
dV
ρβ ,11
1
Γ−−−+−
−−
=    (7) 
Notice as ρi increases, the borrower’s indifference curve rotates clockwise, with the upward-
sloping part of the curve becoming flatter and the downward sloping part becoming steeper as in 
Figure 5.  This implies that, for example, in a Bertrand equilibrium for ρ2 > ρ1 
     12
**** ρρ ii VV >  and 12
**** ρρ ii rr >      (8) 
or that the equilibrium contract for a more impatient borrower is characterized by a higher loan size and 
interest rate than the contract for a more patient borrower.  Thus an MFI operating in the context of 
information sharing between lenders about borrower indebtedness does not face a hidden information 
problem; it can infer a borrower’s impatience from ki and the requested loan size.  As ρi  varies for any 
given ki, it creates a unique tangency point on the isoprofit curve of the lender at a unique level of Vi for 
any given ki, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 





−−
−
Γ−+−
= ik
iiv
v
ii kpp
kpc
p
kV ββ
ρβ ,1
2
1*
.  As Figure 5 shows, with full 
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information sharing, an MFI could make up for the increased likelihood of default on this larger loan 
size by offering even the most impatient borrower a larger loan at a higher interest rate.   
However, when there are multiple lenders and an absence of information sharing about borrower 
indebtedness between them, there is an incentive for borrowers past a certain level =iρ *ρ  to take 
multiple loans, where we assume ∈*ρ  ( ρρ, ).  Previous work typically adds the prevention of multiple 
contracting as a constraint for the principal; instead we take the approach of seeing how multiple 
contracting by borrowers emerges without safeguards, and how the sharing of information can be used 
to prevent it.14   Let *ρ  be the lowest value of iρ  that satisfies the following inequality, in which 
expected profits from multiple loans are higher for the borrower than on a single loan: 
      ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]iiiiiiiiiiiiiBi kVrVpkVrVp ρβρβαρεα ,11,~2~1~211 Γ++−−>Γ++−−−+⋅=Π      (9) 
where α represents an information parameter such that an MFI is able to identify a borrower’s true level 
of indebtedness with probability α before a borrower receives a loan.15  Unless there are institutional 
arrangements for information-sharing between lenders, field experience has shown that α  typically falls 
as the number of MFIs in a given market increases.   
The difference in behavior between more patient and less patient borrowers is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 5 where, for example, the most patient borrower with ρi = ρ  receives an 
equilibrium contract for loan of size )( ii kV

at interest rate ))(( iii kVr

. Under full information sharing, the 
less patient borrower with ρi = ρ*  receives an equilibrium contract for a loan iV

2 at the higher interest 
rate )2( ii Vr

.  A single lender is thus willing to oblige such a borrower by providing a larger loan along 
its zero-profit offer curve at a higher interest rate that accounts for the higher expected rate of default.  
                                                 
14
 The problem of multiple contracting in markets with asymmetric information is not unique to microfinance; see Cawley 
and Philipson (1999) for an application to life-insurance markets, and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) for a more general 
model of non-exclusive contracting in credit markets.   
 
15
 We clarify three additional simplifying assumptions in the extended model: borrowers discovered with multiple loans are 
culled from the portfolio, a borrower who defaults on any loan defaults on all loans, and a borrower who defaults on an MFI 
loan is henceforth able to access credit only from the moneylender. 
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This is the contract that will exist in the absence of information asymmetries under exclusive 
contracting between borrower and lender.  
(Insert Figure 5 here.)   
With an absence of information-sharing between lenders, however, the borrower with ρi ≥ ρ* 
can lower his overall cost of borrowing by obtaining two separate loans from two different lenders, 
while creating the illusion for each lender that he is borrowing a fraction of his actual total—a 
ubiquitous occurrence as reported by MFIs operating in competitive markets.  In the example in 
Figure 5, the less patient borrower with ρ*  benefits by obtaining two loans from two different lenders 
of size )( ii kV

, and paying interest rate ))(( iii kVr

< ))(2( iii kVr

on each of the two different loans, 
increasing his utility to )*( ′Π ρBi .  Moreover, the lower interest rate sensitivity on the joint offer curve 
0)()( 21 =Π+Π iMFIiMFI kk  faced by the multiple-borrower induces the borrower to increase borrowing to 
2 )(2)(~ iiii kVkV

>  by taking two loans of size )(~ ii kV at interest rate ))(
~(~ iii kVr , further increasing the 
impatient borrower’s utility from )*( ′Π ρBi  to )*( ′′Π ρBi .   Multiple contracting occurs in the absence of 
full information because the lender can no longer infer ρi from the requested loan size. The lender 
cannot distinguish between an impatient borrower taking two separate loans of the size a patient 
borrower with the same ki would demand.  Note in our example that instances of multiple contracting 
will occur whenever the full-information equilibrium Vi for the least patient borrower is two or more 
times greater than the equilibrium contract for the most patient borrower for any ki.17 
This behavior creates an externality that raises the overall default rate for MFIs for two reasons:  
First, because the interest rate is lower under multiple borrowing than it would have been with a single 
lender, total borrowing and indebtedness increases within the portfolio of borrowers.  Second, and more 
                                                 
16
 The result is generalizable to a borrower taking more than two separate loans, given sufficient borrower impatience and 
market competitors.  
17
 The result is generalizable to a borrower taking more than two separate loans, given sufficient borrower impatience and 
market competitors.  
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importantly to an individual MFI, the true probability of default is now a function of its own lending 
and of some unknown quantity borrowed from elsewhere.   
This makes the expected default rate of any given borrower i now equal to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )		
		
−
−+
= ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρραρρ
ρραρρ
*
*
*
~21
ˆ
iiii
iiiiii
i
dgdg
dgVpdgVp
p     (10) 
Defining ( )*1 ργ G−≡  as the probability of multiple contracting, and letting )( ii kp and )(~ ii kp  equal 
expected probabilities of default for borrowers (at a given level of ki) with single and multiple loans 
respectively, we obtain                                       
   ( ) ( ) ( )
γα
αγγ
α
−
−+−
=≡
1
~11
,,ˆ
ii
iiii
pp
Vkpp

,    (11) 
noting that ( )αγγ = .  Since an increase in α  makes (9) less likely to be satisfied, 0* >
α
ρ
d
d
and so 
αγ < 0.  (Note since )(ρG  and α  are both assumed to be independent of the distribution of k, we know 
γ  and αγ  are independent as well.)  As seen in (11), as α→1, ii pp →ˆ , or the default rate approaches 
the full information case.  Using (2) and (11), expected profits to the lender for borrower i now become  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
γα
αγγβ
−
Π−+Π−
=−−+−−−=Π
1
~111ˆˆ1
MFI
i
MFI
i
iiiii
MFI
i FcVpVcrp

,    (12) 
where ( )( ) ( ) FVcpVcrp iiiiiMFIi −−+−−−=Π  β11  and ( )( ) ( ) FVcpVcrp iiiiiMFIi −−+−−−=Π ~1~~~1~ β .  Equation 
(12) yields the information necessary for Proposition 5: 
PROPOSITION 5:  If asymmetric information between lenders increases as the number of competing 
lenders increases, borrowers receive less favorable loan contracts after entry of new lenders. 
PROOF: The details of the proof are given in the Appendix.  However, first note the positive relationship 
between profits to each MFI and α.   The Appendix shows that partial differentiation of (12) yields  
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
.      (13) 
Under Bertrand competition, each lender will adjust the contract to borrower P∈i , so the resulting 
equilibrium contract yields 0=Π MFIi .  If new entrants make information-sharing more difficult, total 
differentiation of (12) reveals that each lender’s new zero-profit curve must lie strictly to the right and to 
the interior of the old one.  The lower-information equilibrium with more lenders in the market lies on a 
lower isoprofit function for the borrower at which any size loan, offered at zero-profit to the lender, is 
offered at a higher interest rate. The conclusion from the proof is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows 
the change in the Bertrand competitive equilibrium as α falls.   
Once the competing MFIs respond to multiple contracting by adjusting equilibrium contracts for all 
clients, it is unclear whether or not the impatient have indeed benefited.  The interest rate “discount” 
received though multiple loan contracting may or may not compensate for the fact that every individual 
loan contract is marginally worse.  What is unambiguous is that patient borrowers with ρi < ρ*, who 
find it optimal to borrow only from a single lender, have been hurt by reduced informational flows 
between lenders, and the ensuing instances of multiple contracting by other borrowers.  By undertaking 
action clearly observable to only one lender, the impatient create a classical externality whose costs are 
spread across the whole population of borrowers. 
     (Insert Figure 6 here.) 
4.2 Effect of asymmetric information on the poorest borrowers 
PROPOSITION 6: As asymmetric information between lenders increases, the poorest borrowers are 
dropped from the lending portfolio. 
PROOF:  Consider the poorest borrower P
ˆ
∈ki  who receives a loan with under Bertrand competition 
when ( )**** , iiMFIi rVΠ | α ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01ˆˆˆˆ1 =−−+−−−= FcVkpVcrkp iiiiii β .  Total differentiation yields 
kp
p
d
kd
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
α
α
−= , where 0ˆ <kp  by assumption. We know that ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) 01
~
11
ˆ
ˆ
2 >
−
−
−−−=
∂
∂
≡
γα
αγγγ
α αα
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
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differentiation of (11).  Thus 0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
<−=
kp
p
d
kd α
α
, or as α declines to α′, the poorest borrower who receives an 
MFI loan must have initial assets ii kk ˆˆ >+ψ .  
The intuition to the proof is straightforward.  Increasing information asymmetries increase the cost of 
lending to the entire portfolio of borrowers.  Consider the poorest borrower receiving MFI credit under 
Bertrand competition at a given level α of information sharing, the borrower who has initial assets ikˆ .  
As informational flows decline with an increasing number of lenders in a market to α′ < α, the 
probability of default increases by αpˆ  such that marginally profitable loans to borrowers with level of 
initial assets ikˆ  (and slightly above ikˆ ) become unprofitable.  As a consequence, the dilution of 
information between lenders resulting from the entry of new MFIs in a given area, even non-profit 
institutions, may cause the poorest borrowers to be dropped from MFI portfolios. 
4.3 Conclusions from extended model with asymmetric information: 
• With asymmetric information between competing MFIs, every loan contract yields a lower profit 
to the borrower than under the full information benchmark.  Patient borrowers are always worse 
off with reduced information sharing. It is possible that the impatient borrowers are worse off as 
well, if the negative externality of multiple contracting overwhelms the direct benefit. 
• If asymmetric information between lenders increases with the number of MFIs in the market, 
competition has an unambiguously negative effect on both the most poor and the most patient 
borrowers in the portfolio. 
• Optimal information sharing between lenders must include not only data on defaulting 
borrowers, the lista negra, but also continually updated information on current borrowers, even 
those who are not defaulting, or the lista blanca. 
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5.  Policy Implications 
It seems intuitive that the dramatic growth in the number of MFIs in developing countries, and 
the ensuing competition between them, would have an unambiguously positive effect on low-income 
entrepreneurs in developing countries. However, this research presents number of hypotheses that 
provide reason to question this notion.    
We believe that a number of policy conclusions flow from this research.  At the broadest level, 
the results of the first part of our paper may extend to other instances in which altruistic motivation 
induces a non-profit institution to cross-subsidize.  Examples may include medical or health services, 
socially motivated education programs, or provision of low-income housing, in which there exists some 
degree of competition between for-profit and non-profit entities.   
More specifically to microfinance, our research implies that the structure of funding is 
unimportant in monopolistic markets, whereas the motivation of lenders is less important in competitive 
markets.  Therefore, as competition increases, the onus for the inclusiveness of the market passes from 
the practitioners of microfinance to the donors.  Yet the very existence of competitive markets hinges on 
the idea that grant funding be used in a competitive market only to subsidize the cost of lending to the 
poor.  In light of this, our research supports the notion put forth by Morduch, that financially self-
sufficient MFIs should co-exist with their subsidized counterparts, provided that these subsidies are 
carefully restricted to the poorest borrowers.   
Targeting of subsidies is difficult to achieve in practice, as such constraints are hard to monitor, 
and MFIs themselves may not be able to easily identify the dividing line between profitable and 
unprofitable clients.  In light of these issues, it may be most practical to reserve grants strictly for 
geographical expansion of MFI activity into poor, unserved areas. In this way, donors can avoid 
undermining competitive markets without placing expensive, ill-defined restrictions upon practitioners.  
It also may be possible to restrict grant funding to methodologies that do not appeal to profitable 
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borrowers, such as joint liability lending contracts where loan amounts are typically small and 
organizational costs are high.   
Another clear implication from our research is the need for credit bureaus, or internet-based 
central risk-management systems, which identify outstanding debt in addition to cases of default.  In 
general the astounding growth in MFI lending in many areas has vastly outpaced the ability of MFIs to 
monitor borrower quality and indebtedness.  Among the Central American countries, for example, there 
remains great heterogeneity in informational infrastructure. While some countries such as El Salvador 
have established reasonably well-functioning centralized risk-management structures, others such as 
Nicaragua lag far behind in this area, although the density of MFI activity is extremely high.  At this 
stage in the microfinance movement, the establishment of such centralized risk networks must become a 
leading priority to ensure the success and sustainability of the microfinance movement in LDCs. 
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Appendix 
EXPLICIT FORMULATION OF ASSUMPTIONS AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS: 
Assumption 1: “Moneylender Feasibility”.  Since the maximum interest rate acceptable to a borrower 
lies very close to 1−β , we can approximate the condition for the least favorable loan to a borrower that 
leaves zero profit to the moneylender as ( )( ) mimiiiiMLi FVcVpVp =+−+−=Π )1(1 ββ .  Substituting 
the expression for ( )ii kV *  in (5b) into the moneylender zero-profit condition, and solving for k  shows 
that for moneylender feasibility k  must be ( )


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Assumption 2: “Microfinance Lending Environment”.   Lemma 2 shows that MFI profits in competitive 
equilibrium can be expressed as ( )[ ] FFpp
p
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.  Setting this expression equal to zero and substituting in 
iviki Vpkppp ++=   shows that the equilibrium break-even level of initial borrower assets for the MFI 
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p
k .  By setting the above boundary condition in Assumption 1 for 
k  less than kˆ  and solving for parameter conditions, we find that an unprofitable borrower will exist 
provided that )(2 mv FFp −  ββ −
−
>
ccm
, which holds given sufficiently high β .   Provided that 
ξ+> kk ˆ , more than one profitable borrower will exist, which satisfies the 2nd  part of Assumption 2. 
Boundary Conditions on Default Rate: Here we delineate parameters for the model to ensure that 
( ) 1,0 << ii kVp  for ∀ [ ]kkk i ,∈ .  Substituting ( ) [ ]ik
v
ii kppp
kV −−∆=
2
1*
 into the default function 
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yields ( ) ( )ikii kppkp +∆+= 2
1
.  Recalling that pk < 0, our model parameters must ensure ( ) 1<kp  and 
( ) 0>kp .  The conditions are thus that ( )21 −∆+
−
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p
k
k
and ( )∆+
−
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p
k
k
1
.  The former always 
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>+∆+∆ 423 ξ , which holds given sufficiently high β  relative to pv.    
 
Proof of LEMMA 1: We show in turn that (i) the constraint set impose by any PC (given as a reservation 
level of borrower profit) is compact and convex; (ii) the contract that maximizes lender profit is unique 
for every PC; (iii) that (i) and (ii) yield a set of points that form a Pareto-efficient contract curve for 
each borrower and lender by the assumptions of the model.   
(i) Assumption 1, which says that every borrower in the pool is offered some contract by a monopolistic 
moneylender, ensures that a PC exists and is defined by some level of borrower profit BiΠ  for each 
borrower i.  Re-arranging the borrower’s profit function in (1) and solving for ri at any (non-negative) 
constant level of profit of BiΠ , yields 1)1( −−−−
Π
−=
iviki
B
i
i VpkppV
r β .  Differentiation gives 
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= , meaning that borrower isoprofit curves are positively (negatively) 
sloped for viki pkppV 2/)1)(( −−>< .  Furthermore, we have 
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. Thus, the 
borrower’s isoprofit curves are concave and decreasing in ri, which implies that the upper contour set 
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above any isoprofit contour is a convex set.  Setting ri = 0 for the borrower’s profit function in (1) and 
solving for Vi, note that the each isoprofit curve of the borrower, for any ε≥Π B , intersects the Vi axis 
at the positive values HV and LV  ( )
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constraint set is closed follows from the observation that (a) ( )iiB rV ,Π  is a continuous function; and 
(b) the constraint set is the intersection of ( ){ }0 and   , ≥≤≤ iHiLii rVVVrV  and the inverse image, under 
BΠ , of the set ( ){ }iiBiBiBi rV ,  Π≥ΠΠ .  Boundedness follows from the fact that the constraint set lies at 
and below the isoprofit curve defined by (1) within and including the positive values HV  and LV , 
together with non-negativity constraint that 0≥ir . Since all inequalities are weak, the constraint set is 
bounded.  Therefore, the constraint set is compact and convex, and a maximum exists.   
(ii) The properties of the lender’s isoprofit contours can be similarly derived re-arranging (2) 
while holding lender profits constant and solving for ri, yielding )1(
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Since for the borrower and lender isoprofit curves 0<
i
i
dV
dr
 and 0>
i
i
dV
dr
 respectively for 
viki pkppV 2/)1( −−>  (i.e. for 0)1( <−− Vpp vi ), a sufficient condition to establish a lender maximum 
at the tangency point to BiΠ  is that ( )ii Vr  is convex for vikiL pkppVV 2/)1( −−≤≤ . When 0)1( >−− Vpp vi , 
which is true at ( )ikV *  by Assumption 3, it is easily shown that for sufficiently large kp , 0≥+Π LLi F . 
Thus the lender’s isoprofit curve is increasing and convex over vikiL pkppVV 2/)1( −−≤≤  and hence at 
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( )ikV * .  That the tangency point ( )** , ii rV  defined by ( )ikV *  at each level of BiΠ  and ∈i  is unique is 
shown by equation (5b) and the fact that ( )ii Vr  is one-to-one over the domain [ ]vikL pkppVV 2/)1(, −−= .  
We know that the optimal ( )ikV *  that defines each horizontal contract curve lies within [ ]HL VV ,  (and 
thus satisfies the non-negativity constraints) for ∀ ],[ kkk i ∈ , since re-arranging (5b) yields the 
condition ( )∆−
−
> p
p
k
k
1
, which satisfies the boundary condition that 
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Assumption 1.  Furthermore, note that ( )ii kV *  can never exceed HV  since ( ) viki pkppkV 2/)1(* −−< .   
(iii) Assumption 1 guarantees that the PC (and thus a contract curve) is defined for all ∈i  with each 
lender.  That the locus of points on the contract curve are Pareto-efficient can be proven by 
contradiction: If a point on the contract curve were not Pareto-efficient, another contract would exist for 
which ( )iiLi rV ,Π  could be increased holding ( )iiBi rV ,Π  constant.  But then this point could not have 
been a maximum of the objective function, and hence could not be on the contract curve.  
  
Proof of LEMMA 2: We prove each part of the LEMMA sequentially: 
(i). Partial differentiation of equation (5b) shows that 0
2
>
−
=
∂
∂
=
∂
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v
k
i
m
i
i
i
p
p
k
V
k
V
.    
(ii). To show that MFI profits in competition with a moneylender are higher for higher ik , we solve 
explicitly for the equilibrium MFI loan as a function of parameters.  First, we utilize the fact that the 
zero-profit constraint of the moneylender will bind for all loans under competition. Hence we can solve 
for the equilibrium rate of interest charged by the moneylender, ∗mir  for ∀ i in the MFI portfolio. Letting 
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   In the continuous equilibrium, the PC will bind such that ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗ Π=Π iiBimimiBi rVrV ,,  for all 
borrowers.  (To see this, suppose it did not; by increasing ir to the point where the PC binds, the MFI 
could retain that borrower in the portfolio NP ~∪  and relax the BC.  Therefore, the original contract 
could not have been an equilibrium.)  We substitute ∗mir  into the binding PC 
)
1
)1(
)()(1())1()()(1( *
m
i
mm
im
i
m
m
v
m
i
mm
iiii p
cp
p
Fp
pprpp
−
++−
−∆
−−∆−=+−−∆−
β
ββ  and solve for the 
competitive equilibrium MFI rate of interest *ir as a function of the parameters of the model, obtaining 
1))(1(
)()( 2
*
−
−∆−
−−−∆
−=
ii
m
v
m
i
m
i pp
Fpp
r
βββ .  Substituting for *ir  and *iV , we can now solve explicitly for 
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Taking the derivative of this equilibrium MFI profit level with respect to k, we get 
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, which > 0  if ))(( ββ −−>− miim ppcc .  Substituting 
in the default function, iviki Vpkppp ++= , into this expression, we can rewrite this inequality as 
))(( ββ −−>− miivm VVpcc .  Solving explicitly for the optimal loan size as a function of ik , 
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 By Assumption 2, 0)(* >Π ki , and 0)(* <Π ki .  )(* ii kΠ  is a continuous, increasing function of k  
because p is a continuous function of  k and vp  is a positive constant, so by the Intermediate Value 
Theorem there exists some kˆ , with kkk << ˆ , for which 0)ˆ(* =Π ki .  We denote as the “break-even 
borrower” the individual iˆ whose capital endowment ikˆ  is the closest to kˆ  while being  ≥ kˆ ; thus for 
the break even-borrower it will be the case that 0)(
ˆ
* ≥Π ii k  but 0)( 1ˆ* <Π −ii k .   
(iii). That MFI client-maximization implies cross subsidization from P  to NP~  flows directly from 
the preceding arguments; the MFI maximizes its number of clients by maximizing profits for P  and 
minimizing losses in capturing NP~ , both subject to the PC, and hence uses profits from the former to 
cross-subsidize the latter.  To show that it is able to do so, first note that 
0
))((2
2
*2
=
−−−
=
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v
kkk
MFI
p
ppp
k
ββ
, so the profits of the MFI in equilibrium are an increasing and 
linear function of k .  Since we have assumed that ikˆ  refers to the assets of the borrower who weakly 
satisfies a zero-profit condition for the MFI under competition, 0)ˆ(* ≥Π iMFI k .  The linearity of the 
profit function combined with the uniform distribution of k implies that 
))(()()( 1ˆ*1ˆ*ˆ* −+ Π−≥Π+Π iii kkk . Since Assumption 2 tells us that there exist one unprofitable borrower 
and more than one profitable borrower, 1ˆ+ik  and 1ˆ−ik  exist and thus cross-subsidization of at least 1ˆ−ik  is 
possible.                      
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 (iv). Let 
=
+ +Π≡
n
ii
ii GkS
ˆ
* )(  be the surplus profits from lending to profitable borrowers plus the 
subsidy received by the MFI.  In addition, let 
=
−
+ Π+=
m
j
jiim kSS
1
ˆ
* )(  for =m 1, . ., 1ˆ −i  be the finite, 
decreasing sequence of  total profits from lending to successive borrowers below kˆ .  The maximum 
number of borrowers *n , and hence the equilibrium, will be reached when mS  is as close to zero as 
possible while remaining non-negative.  Consider three cases: (a) If 0=mS  for some *m , then the BC 
and the PCs all bind in equilibrium, and 1ˆ ** ++−= minn .  For simplicity of exposition we have 
assumed case (a) to be operative in our analysis.  The alternative cases do not affect the fundamental 
insights of our model, but are nevertheless interesting.  (b) If 0>mS  for *m  but 0<mS  for *m +1, then 
some small residual profit exists due to the discrete distribution of ik .  In this case an infinite number of 
equilibrium contracts exist in which this residual profit may be distributed within the portfolio, and 
either the BC or some borrowers’ PCs do not bind, but *m  and hence *n  remain unchanged.  (c) If 
0>mS  when nn =
*
, the MFI has surplus funds even after reaching the entire group of potential 
borrowers.  Note, however, even in this case nn =*  remains unique regardless of the rule used to 
dispose of excess profits.  Thus for any given MFI subsidy G ≥ 0, [ ]1ˆ,1 * −−∈∀ mii  receive the 
monopolistic moneylender contract ),(),( mimiii rVrV = , and no loan contract from the MFI, and 
[ ] ,ˆ * nmii −∈∀  receive the MFI loan contract ),(),( ** iiii rVrV =  and no loan from the moneylender.  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:  Consider competition between two client-maximizing MFIs, h ={1, 2} 
with non-targeted subsidies  and , respectively.  A best response by MFIh to any an existing subsidy 
pattern involves a re-allocation of subsidy over   so as to minimize the subsidy cost of capturing each 
borrower, subject to the PC and BC.  Therefore, a Nash equilibrium must satisfy the following 
necessary conditions:  (i) MFIjMFIi Π=Π  for NPP
~
 ∪∈∀ ji,  and h ={1, 2}, or that the loss from 
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capturing all *2
*
1 nn +  borrowers in the total portfolios of 1, 2 must be equal.  (Suppose not: If 
MFI
j
MFI
i Π>Π  and i and j belong to the portfolio of different MFIs, this implies that MFIh with i can 
release i and capture j from MFI
~h while relaxing its BC; if i and j both belong to MFIh, then this implies 
that MFIiΠ  or 
MFI
jΠ  must be > or < MFIxΠ , where borrower x is some borrower in the portfolio of 
MFI
~h.  If MFIiΠ or 
MFI
jΠ  > 
MFI
xΠ , then borrower x can be captured from MFI~h while relaxing the BC 
of MFIh.  If MFIiΠ or 
MFI
jΠ  < 
MFI
xΠ , then either i or j can be captured from MFIh by MFI~h, thus 
relaxing the BC of MFI
~h.)  (ii) The PC must be binding for the poorest borrower NPi  ~∪∈ , where 
i = ki~ .  (Suppose not: If the PC is not satisfied, then this is a contradiction because ki~ cannot be in the 
total MFI portfolio, NPP  ~∪ .  If the PC is satisfied, but non-binding for ki~ , then by LEMMA 2, 
borrower ki~ -1 can be captured for a lower subsidy cost than ki~ by either MFIh or MFI~h (assuming 
sufficiently small ξ), thus relaxing the BC of either MFI.)   (iii) The BC must bind for both 1, 2. 
(Suppose not: In this case, an additional borrower can be captured by MFIh if its BC is not binding, and 
*
1n and *2n are not maximized.)   The unique Nash equilibrium that satisfies all three necessary conditions 
is the subsidy pattern in which *2*1 nn +  borrowers in 
NP

 ~∪  receive the subsidy equal to MFIiΠ , 
kii ~= , so that ( ) MFIinn Π⋅+=+ *2*1  .  The subsidy allocation is a Nash equilibrium since the 
subsidy patterns by 1, 2 constitute a mutual best response; it is a unique Nash equilibrium because it is 
the only subsidy pattern that satisfies the necessary conditions, (i),(ii), and (iii), for a Nash equilibrium. 
Thus each borrower NPi  ~∪∈  will receive a subsidy equal to 
*
2
*
1 nn +
+   and MFIh will lend to 
( )




+
+ *2
*
1 nn
 borrowers, and the share of borrowers for MFIh will be 




+
 as seen in Figure 3, 
where the specific types of borrower i served by each institution are undetermined.  
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:  (For simplicity, and without loss of generality, consider the case in which 
 = 0 for all competing MFIs.) Let the set of possible contracts { }αii r,V , for some borrower Pi ∈  
satisfy ( ) α 0, =Π iiMFIi rV , or zero MFI profits at information-sharing level α.  Note that the Bertrand 
equilibrium MFI contract { }α**** , ii rV ∈{ }αii r,V , and that by LEMMA 1 the Bertrand equilibrium contract 
is Pareto efficient.  First we show that as α declines to α′, we have ( )  0, <Π iiMFIi rV for all { }αii r,V . 
Partially differentiating the right-hand-side of (12) we obtain 
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and through algebraic manipulation and cancellation of terms, reduces to  
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i
.  Thus as α falls to α′, we have ( )
 0, <Π ii
MFI
i rV for all { }αii r,V , 
and therefore ( ) α   , **** iiBi rVΠ  cannot be a Bertrand equilibrium contract for borrower i at α′, i.e. 
{ }α**** , ii rV ∉{ } 'αii r,V .  Second, we show that the Bertrand equilibrium contract ( ) '  0, **** α=Π iiBi rV  is 
less favorable to the borrower than ( ) α   , **** iiBi rVΠ .  Totally differentiating the left-hand-side of (12) 
yields ( )( )i
ii
p
rp
d
dr
ˆ1
1ˆ
−
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β
α
α < 0, noting that ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) 01
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 from 
differentiation of (11).  Thus we know that ( ) '  0, **** α=Π iiMFIi rV  is characterized by a higher ri for any 
given level of Vi  relative to the { }αii r,V  pair that satisfies ( ) α  0, **** =Π iiMFIi rV .  Noting that borrower 
profits are monotonically decreasing in ri, i.e. that ( ) 01 <−−=∂
Π∂
ii
i
B
i pV
r
, it must be true that 
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( ) α ′Π    , **** iiBi rV  is less than ( ) α   , **** iiBi rVΠ  since under α′, borrower Pi ∈  pays a strictly higher 
interest rate ri for any level of borrowed capital Vi at α′ than at information-sharing level α > α′.  
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Table 1: Growth in Microenterprise lending, Nicaragua 
 Borrowers 
1999 
Portfolio 
US$ 1999 
%Arrears 
1999 
Borrowers 
2001 
Portfolio US$ 
2001 
%Arrears 
2001 
ASODENIC 10,568 1,711,801 8.00 24,000 2,995,942 10.39 
FAMA 6,087 6,230,864 0.21 16,402 6,948,907 1.63 
FINCA 15,275 1,688,417 0.00 24,888 2,680,631 9.00 
FUNDENUSE 2,129 913,945 4.40 5,940 1,609,631 5.20 
ProMujer 10,121 317,870 1.25 10,561 629,385 0.35 
Five-MFI Total 44,180 10,862,897 1.79 81,791 14,864,496 5.06 
Source: USAID Microfinance Results Reporting.   Averages for 5-MFI Total are portfolio weighted. 
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